



# AFTER THE EARTHQUAKE

## CHANGING SITUATIONS, OPINIONS, AND EXPECTATIONS

(RESEARCH REPORT)

PRE-EARTHQUAKE CONTEXT | POST-EARTHQUAKE CONTEXT | THOSE WHO LEFT,  
THOSE WHO STAYED, THOSE WHO RETURNED | WHO IS RESPONSIBLE?  
DISASTER MANAGEMENT AND INSTITUTIONS | LEVEL OF TRUST



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(RESEARCH REPORT)

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## INTRODUCTION

This investigation encompasses an analysis conducted across various districts in the aftermath of the seismic events that occurred on February 6. The locales under examination encompass Yeşilyurt, Battalgazi, and Doğanşehir districts of Malatya, alongside Merkez and Gölbaşı districts of Adıyaman, all of which were significantly impacted by the aforementioned earthquakes. Further, the study extends its purview to Onikişubat, Dulkadiroğlu, and Elbistan districts of Kahramanmaraş, Antakya, Defne, and Samandağı districts of Hatay, and Nurdağı and İslahiye districts of Gaziantep. In order to facilitate a comprehensive understanding of the seismic event's implications, a rigorous methodology was employed, involving face-to-face interviews with a total of 2000 participants. The research adhered to a 95% confidence interval, thereby yielding a margin of error of  $\pm 2.5$ . These interviews were distributed as follows: 31.5% in Malatya, 29.6% in Kahramanmaraş, 22.9% in Hatay, 7.3% in Gaziantep, and 8.8% in Adıyaman. The preponderance of interviews conducted in Malatya may prompt inquiry into the rationale behind this distribution. Consequently, it may be advisable to furnish an explanatory elucidation regarding the underlying logic governing the allocation of interviews. Worth noting is that, in the course of the interviews, certain sessions were held in outdoor settings, such as on the streets, in coffeehouses, and cafes, while others transpired within the confines of respondents' residences, workplaces, or within temporary structures like tents and containers erected post-earthquake for habitation.

Regarding household composition, approximately a quarter of respondents (26%) reside in households comprising 4 or 5 members, with 25.5% in the former category. Households consisting of 3 individuals account for 18.1% of the sample, while those with 2 members make up 11.5%, and those with 6 members constitute 10.3%. Single-person households are reported by 2.7% of participants. The majority, approximately 80%, live in households ranging from 2 to 5 individuals.

Occupation distribution is diverse, with the largest contingent being full-time paid workers (31.5%) and housewives (25.5%). Students comprise 16.2% of the respondents, retirees 7.8%, the unemployed actively seeking employment 5.6%, the unemployed not actively seeking employment 4.7%, and self-employed individuals make up 5.9%.

In terms of educational attainment, 39% of participants have not completed high school, while 28.7% hold a high school diploma, and 16.1% have pursued education beyond high school. A similar proportion, 16.1%, is currently engaged in educational pursuits.

The distribution of household income reveals that 46.3% of those interviewed have incomes ranging from 10,000 to 20,000 Turkish Lira (TL), 37.4% earn between 5,000 and 10,000 TL, 12.6% have household incomes exceeding 20,000 TL, and 3.7% earn less than 5,000 TL. Additionally, it is noteworthy that 29.7% of respondents lack any form of social security, while 59.6% are insured by the Social Security Institution (SGK), 8% possess green cards, and 2.7% are covered by private insurance policies.

The research methodology included in-depth interviews conducted with 42 individuals for qualitative analysis. Notably, 10 of these interviews involved representatives from non-governmental organizations (NGOs), politicians, and academics who are actively engaged in earthquake-related work. Furthermore, two focus group discussions were convened during the interviews, with careful consideration given to ensuring diversity in terms of age, gender, and socio-economic backgrounds. The interviews, which spanned Adana, Adıyaman, Hatay, Maraş, and Malatya provinces, not only delved into the daily life challenges faced by the earthquake victims but also encompassed inquiries concerning their emotional states, future outlook, perceptions of institutional efficacy, and electoral preferences.

Of particular interest, the responses to the query regarding the primary factors contributing to the destructive impact of the earthquake reveal that the interviewees attribute greater responsibility to contractors, followed by municipalities, and, to a lesser extent, the government.

# FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

## SUMMARY

The findings gleaned from this investigation illuminate a notable deficiency in public awareness regarding seismic risks within the society. This dearth of knowledge manifests itself on two distinct levels: firstly, a substantial portion of the populace remains oblivious to the seismic vulnerability of the urban locales they inhabit. Secondly, a considerable number of individuals are uncertain about the earthquake resilience of their dwellings, and this aspect has rarely crossed their contemplation.

While pervasive ignorance prevails, instances of households that escaped unscathed from the seismic event are relatively scarce. Given the extensive geographical footprint of the earthquake's impact, it is pertinent to acknowledge that the majority of respondents inhabited residences that experienced varying degrees of structural damage.

Economic concerns, prominently underscored by issues such as unemployment, soaring prices, and inflationary pressures, assume paramount significance for a majority of the interviewees. Notably, when queried about Turkey's foremost challenges, the triad of economy, unemployment, and the cost of living occupy the top tier. This configuration suggests that the thematic agenda and problem hierarchy, as perceived by the earthquake-affected region, exhibit limited divergence from the broader national context.

Profoundly restrained levels of life satisfaction characterize the prevailing sentiment, as one might anticipate. However, it is intriguing to observe disparities in life satisfaction across distinct demographic and experiential cohorts. Specifically, diminished life satisfaction aligns with conditions of poverty, extensive property damage, female gender, advanced age, Arab ethnicity, Alevi religious affiliation, and political allegiance to the CHP (Republican People's Party) and HDP (Peoples' Democratic Party). These variations underscore the nuanced interplay between post-earthquake experiences and individuals' political and cultural identities.

As expected, the emotional landscape is predominantly characterized by negative sentiments, including anxiety, anger, and pessimism. Distinct emotional profiles emerge within different segments of the population, with women displaying higher levels of anger but lower degrees of distress compared to men. Conversely, younger respondents manifest greater apprehension than their older counterparts, while individuals with higher educational attainment exhibit heightened pessimism relative to those with lower educational backgrounds.

The earthquake disrupted educational activities within the affected region, with the extent of disruption being contingent upon household income, property damage severity, cultural identity, and post-earthquake relocation.

Access to healthcare services, while generally not fraught with catastrophic obstacles,

is subject to perception variations conditioned by political and cultural affiliations. Respondents identifying as Arabs, Alevis, HDP supporters, and CHP supporters tend to harbor more negative views concerning access to healthcare services compared to their counterparts.

The majority of interviewees opted to remain in the city where the earthquake transpired, and those who relocated predominantly sought refuge with close family members, relatives, or friends. This phenomenon underscores the enduring strength of traditional social bonds in Turkey, contrasting with the relatively limited reach and efficacy of public institutions in the wake of seismic events.

It is noteworthy that a minority segment holds the belief that the destructive outcome could not have been averted. A substantial majority, nearly seventy percent of the interviewees, assert that greater precautions could have mitigated the extent of devastation. This conviction is notably more pronounced among respondents possessing higher education and income levels, students, individuals residing in heavily damaged dwellings, those of Arab ethnicity, and voters affiliated with the CHP, HDP, and İYİ Party.

## TRUST IN INSTITUTIONS AND GROUPS POST-EARTHQUAKE

The responses elicited from inquiries aimed at gauging alterations in trust toward various institutions and groups in the aftermath of the earthquake reveal three salient observations:

Trust in entities or associations tangentially connected to earthquake and disaster management exhibits a relatively stable trajectory, characterized by limited fluctuations.

Conversely, trust in institutions with direct roles in earthquake and disaster management, including the Presidency, Government, Governorship, Turkish Armed Forces, Law enforcement forces, and Municipality, has undergone a notable and substantial decline.

The discernible erosion in trust within the sphere of earthquake and disaster management institutions is neither uniform nor evenly distributed. Instead, it manifests significant variability contingent upon variables such as educational attainment, income levels, cultural identities, and political proclivities.

# I. PRE-EARTHQUAKE CONTEXT

## PLACE OF RESIDENCE

Prior to the earthquake, the predominant residential arrangement among the interviewees was occupancy in apartment complexes, constituting 62.5% of the surveyed population. Detached houses comprised the residence for 33.9% of respondents. Moreover, it is noteworthy that a majority of the interviewees, accounting for 68.3%, owned the residence they inhabited before the seismic event, while 23.9% were tenants.


## EARTHQUAKE AWARENESS

Alarming, a substantial proportion of the surveyed population, accounting for 38%, lacked awareness of the earthquake risk inherent in their respective urban locales. Conversely, 32.6% displayed a cognizance of the earthquake risk, while an additional 29% exhibited partial awareness.

## EARTHQUAKE RESILIENCE OF RESIDENCES

An appraisal of the perceptions regarding the earthquake resilience of residential abodes reveals intriguing dynamics. Approximately 12% of respondents expressed skepticism regarding the earthquake resistance of their dwellings. Meanwhile, a notable proportion, 31.3%, professed ignorance regarding the earthquake resistance status of their residences. Notably, 20.1% harbored the belief that their homes were exceptionally earthquake-resistant, while an additional 23% opined that they were only partially resilient to seismic events. Curiously, 13.6% admitted to never having contemplated the earthquake resistance of their homes.

**Figure 1. Prior to the earthquake, what were your perceptions concerning the earthquake resistance of the dwelling in which you resided? (%)**



## II. POST-EARTHQUAKE CONTEXT

### DAMAGE ASSESSMENT

The seismic event impacted a substantial proportion of the interviewees, with 91.3% experiencing the earthquake in the city where the interviews were conducted. Notably, 12.5% of respondents reported no damage to their residences during the earthquake. Conversely, 9.9% witnessed complete demolition of their homes, while 23.9% encountered severe structural damage. The category of homes with moderate damage constituted 14.5%, and those with minor damage comprised 39.1%.

**Table 1. Was the dwelling in which you currently reside adversely affected by the seismic event? If it sustained damage, what specific types of damage did it incur as a result of the earthquake? (Ethnicity, %)**

	General	Turkish	Kurdish	Arab	Other
It was rendered uninhabitable	9,9	10,1	8,6	12,0	9,1
Major damage	23,9	24,7	21,0	25,3	27,3
Medium damage	14,5	15,6	11,9	12,7	27,3
Minimal damage	39,1	35,5	46,4	46,2	18,2
No damage	12,5	14,0	12,2	3,8	18,2
Other	0,1	0,1	0,0	0,0	0,0

It is pertinent to underscore that no discernible relationship was ascertained between the extent of damage to residences during the earthquake and identity variables such as ethnicity and sect. Across different ethnic groups, the rates of homes destroyed, severely damaged, or undamaged displayed notable parity.

**Table 2. Was the dwelling in which you currently reside adversely affected by the seismic event? (Income post-earthquake, %)**

	General	0-5.000	5.001-10.000	10.001-20.000	Incomes exceeding 20,000 TL
It was rendered uninhabitable	9,9	5,5	10,0	11,7	4,8
Major damage	23,9	47,3	31,9	15,7	23,3
Medium damage	14,5	12,7	11,9	15,8	17,5
Minimal damage	39,1	27,3	32,6	43,2	47,1
No damage	12,5	7,3	13,5	13,5	7,4
Other	0,1	0,0	0,0	0,1	0,0

In contrast, a notable correlation was identified between household income groups and the susceptibility of residences to earthquake damage. While 9.9% of interviewees experienced complete destruction of their homes, this rate stood at 5.5% for those with incomes less than 5,000 TL and 4.8% for those with incomes exceeding 20,000 TL. This disparity between lower-income and upper-income groups may be attributed to two plausible phenomena: a potentially elevated prevalence of low-rise housing in the former group and a greater incidence of sturdier and low-rise housing in the latter.

## HOUSEHOLD COMPOSITION POST-EARTHQUAKE

Following the earthquake, there was limited change in the number of individuals contributing to household incomes. Approximately 2.8% of interviewees reported an increase in the number of income contributors in their households, while 8.4% indicated a decrease. The remaining 88.8% reported no change in this regard.

## HOUSEHOLD INCOME POST-EARTHQUAKE


Before the earthquake, 45% of those surveyed reported household incomes falling within the range of 10,000-20,000 TL, while 40.9% fell within the 5,000-10,000 TL bracket, and 10.5% enjoyed household incomes exceeding 20,000 TL. A minority, comprising 3.5%, reported incomes of 5,000 TL or less. In the aftermath of the earthquake, the proportion of households with incomes of 5,000 TL or less declined to 3.7%, whereas households earning between 5,000 and 10,000 TL diminished to 37.4%. In contrast, those with household incomes ranging from 10,000 to 20,000 TL expanded to 46.3%, and those with incomes exceeding 20,000 TL increased to 12.6%.

The decrease in the prevalence of households with incomes below 10,000 TL and the concurrent increase in households earning 10,000 TL and above appear to be linked to nominal wage and commercial income increments driven by recent elevated inflation rates.

## PRIMARY CONCERNS

In excess of fifty percent of the interviewees identified economic-related issues as paramount concerns, including unemployment, surging prices, and inflation. Additional prominent concerns encompassed education, earthquake repercussions, housing, immigration, and justice.

Figure 2. Could you please identify what you consider to be the most significant challenges currently facing Turkey? Provide a list of the top three issues that, in your opinion, hold utmost importance (%)



Examining the responses to the query, “What are Turkey’s most significant challenges?” reveals the predominance of economic anxieties, with the economy, unemployment, and the cost of living emerging as the top three priorities. The earthquake, conversely, ranks as a concern commensurate with immigration issues. Notably, financial strains loom large within the perceptual landscape, underscoring the endurance of the established national agenda and problem hierarchy vis-à-vis the earthquake-affected region.

## ECONOMIC STRAIN

Qualitative interviews with NGO representatives and citizens further substantiate the post-earthquake prominence of economic tribulations. Preexisting economic difficulties appear to have intensified owing to the destruction wrought by the earthquake.

“If there was no economic crisis, it would be easier to overcome the crisis caused by the earthquake. So purchasing power decreases. The purchasing power of money decreases, and if you are in an earthquake zone, the rent increases to ten to fifteen thousand liras. It’s not just about rent. There is no general purchasing power left.” (Malatya, Financial advisor, Male, 59)

The narratives conveyed in these interviews underscore the pivotal significance of measures aimed at economic recovery in regions reliant on commerce for their economic vitality.

“The real lasting impact is the economic impact. Malatya is a city built on a single city centre. So, consider the Suriçi district of Diyarbakır. That market area has completely collapsed and that one looks like a field. An area of two hundred acres. It turned into a field. There are a lot of people with businesses there. There are a lot of people who make their living from the rent of the workplace there. Here he rented a house, so I have what I experienced. There are people whose monthly rental income is probably hundreds of thousands or even a million. It suddenly went to zero, look at it from a rental income perspective. The businesses of people from that workplace have completely collapsed. Now, there are small containers here, so which business will you fit into a container there?” (Malatya, Housewife, Female, 58)

## HOUSING

Qualitative insights gleaned from interviews underscore that housing constitutes the most pressing concern within the earthquake-affected zone, a condition that intensifies ancillary challenges. While container cities offer a somewhat more habitable alternative to tent cities, several issues persist, including deficient infrastructure, oppressive climatic conditions, limited privacy, and security concerns. Interviewees who experienced varying degrees of damage to their homes express reservations regarding the accuracy and transparency of damage assessments. Escalating rental costs further compound the housing predicament. Prospects for the delivery of new homes to alleviate the housing crisis appear dim. Lingering delays in debris removal efforts give rise to skepticism regarding the prospects of rehabilitation for residential spaces and the eventual restoration of homes.

“The housing predicament looms large in Adıyaman. Presently, the costliest rents in Turkey soar to ten thousand Turkish Liras in our Adıyaman neighborhood. This, mind you, is a neighborhood characterized by economic hardship. Ten thousand liras in the most economically challenged neighborhood. ‘Rents in Adıyaman now peak at twenty thousand liras.’” (Adıyaman, Construction worker, Male, 55)

“Our house was classified as ‘demolished’ in the system on the third day after the earthquake. There exists a process known as ‘entitlement,’ I submitted an application. However, it still reads as ‘under evaluation.’ ‘You have already acknowledged that my house is in ruins, yet it is taking an inexplicably long time for the assessment,’ is the sentiment expressed. It implies that public service delivery is advancing at a sluggish pace.” (Maraş, Civil Servant, Male, 50)

## PRIVACY

In tandem with housing concerns, privacy emerges as a substantial issue. Qualitative interviews affirm that individuals residing in tents and containers grapple with pronounced privacy challenges.

“Our most acute issue in the tents is the bathroom facilities. We are compelled to seal the tent and shower inside due to the absence of dedicated bathing areas, rendering the entire tent damp. There is a heightened apprehension of germ transmission; it is an exceedingly unfavorable situation. ‘The container offers an improved setting, particularly in terms of hygiene.’” (Hatay, Student, Female, 21)

“... Individuals continually approach with inquiries, including container attendants, which is, of course, their duty. They perform these tasks on our behalf, but it disrupts the sense of home comfort as people are constantly in and out. Opening doors and windows becomes a challenge. This absence of personal space at home is acutely felt. Previously, someone would ring the doorbell, and you would prepare yourself and open the door. It is different here. The door stands ajar, accessible to all. Hence, privacy is a contentious issue.” (Maraş, Teacher, Female, 24)

“The concept of privacy has been rendered virtually nonexistent. None of us retains it anymore. Given the proximity of tents to one another, even within the prefabricated structures where we currently reside, I can discern the conversations of our neighbors. As a consequence, privacy has been wholly obliterated in the aftermath of this earthquake. ‘No secrets remain, particularly between spouses or within families.’”  
(Adiyaman, Teacher, Female, 25)

## LIFE SATISFACTION

As anticipated, life satisfaction levels witnessed a marked decline post-earthquake. The percentage of respondents categorized as “very satisfied” plummeted from 29.4% to 11.9%, “moderately satisfied” respondents decreased from 39.5% to 32.2%, “slightly satisfied” individuals dropped from 11.6% to 16.8%, while those “completely dissatisfied” surged from 19.5% to 39.1%.

Figure 3. What is your current level of life satisfaction at present? (%)





Figure 4. What was your level of life satisfaction before the earthquake occurred? (%)



A noticeable disparity emerges in post-earthquake life satisfaction, with a higher proportion of dissatisfaction among women in comparison to men and among individuals aged over 50 when juxtaposed with those under 30. Specifically, 44.2% of women and 33.7% of men express complete life dissatisfaction. Similarly, 43.5% of respondents aged over 50 report complete dissatisfaction with their lives, while this figure stands at 37.6% among those under 30.

Furthermore, the incidence of complete life dissatisfaction is more prevalent among those with lower income relative to their higher-income counterparts, as well as among individuals residing in homes that were destroyed or severely damaged in contrast to those residing in undamaged or slightly damaged dwellings post-earthquake. It also manifests with greater frequency among Arab individuals compared to Turks and Kurds,

among Alevis relative to Hanafis (Sunnis), and among voters aligned with the CHP and HDP in contrast to AK Party voters.

Specifically, the rate of complete life dissatisfaction is 38% among those with a monthly income of 20,000 TL or more, and 62.3% among those earning less than 5,000 TL. Correspondingly, 30.9% of individuals residing in homes undamaged by the earthquake, 29.1% of those in slightly damaged residences, 51% of those inhabiting earthquake-destroyed homes, and 52% of those in heavily damaged houses report complete life dissatisfaction. Ethnicity-related variations include 38.2% among Turks, 32.9% among Kurds, 58.2% among Arabs. Cultural affiliations also shape this trend, with 34.3% among Hanafis, 59.8% among Alevis. Political orientation plays a role, with 29.4% among AKP voters, 53.6% among CHP voters, and 63.6% among HDP voters registering complete life dissatisfaction.

The findings underscore that gender, age, economic status, ethnicity, dwelling damage level, psychological and physical factors, cultural and political identities contribute to variations in life satisfaction. This distribution highlights that life satisfaction is influenced partly by experiences post-earthquake and partly by pre-existing political or cultural identities.

## EMOTIONAL RESPONSES

Responses to the question, “What are the emotions you experienced most intensely after the earthquake?” reveal that anxiety supersedes sadness in prominence. While initial post-earthquake sentiments likely leaned toward sadness, the passage of time has seen anxiety take precedence.

Increased concerns about the future appear to heighten feelings of anxiety. Confidence in the future appears to be lacking, further contributing to the prevalence of pessimism. Of those surveyed, 60.7% admit to experiencing worry, 50.5% sadness, and 31.8% pessimism.

Fatigue emerges as the prevailing emotion experienced by interviewees after anxiety and sadness, with 38.3% of respondents expressing feelings of weariness. Additionally, 28.3%

Figure 5. What were the top three emotions you experienced most intensely after the earthquake? (%)





Figure 6. To what extent do you agree with the following statements? Please rate them on a scale of 1 to 10.



of interviewees reported anger, 25.7% experienced negativity, and 24.9% conveyed feelings of helplessness. Conversely, only 2.8% expressed enthusiasm, 2.8% felt optimism, and a mere 1.7% reported a sense of tranquility.

Given the magnitude of the devastation and the perceived inadequacy of post-disaster administration, it is unsurprising that interviewees predominantly reported experiencing negative emotions, with diminished feelings of optimism, peace, and enthusiasm. However, the variation in emotional states among different groups merits attention. Notably, significant disparities exist between genders concerning anger, with 25.1% of men and 31.5% of women expressing anger. Conversely, 29.8% of men reported unhappiness, while only 21.3% of women expressed unhappiness.

Moreover, younger individuals appear to exhibit greater levels of anxiety compared to their older counterparts. While 68.1% of those aged 18-29 reported experiencing worry, the rate among those over the age of 50 stood at 55.6%. In contrast, feelings of helplessness were more pronounced among those aged over 50, with 29.2% reporting such feelings, while only 21% of those between 18-29 admitted to feeling helpless.

Education levels also appear to exert an influence on mood. Individuals with less than a high school education tend to report lower levels of anxiety and pessimism in comparison to those with more than a high school education. For instance, 53.7% of those with lower education levels indicated experiencing worry, whereas 73.6% of those with higher education levels reported similar feelings. Similarly, 30.1% of respondents with education below high school level reported feeling pessimistic, compared to 39.3% among those with education above high school.

In contrast to these variations based on gender, age, and education, identity and political preference variables do not appear to significantly affect emotional states.

Qualitative interviews provide a more nuanced understanding of emotional states. Interviewees can articulate their emotions more effectively in qualitative settings. The emotions most vividly expressed in these interviews revolve around the traumas stemming from losses incurred during the earthquake. Many interviewees feel compelled to discuss the trauma resulting from the debris and loss of life.

“...I often hear people here saying, and I’ve said it myself, ‘The ones who passed away are the lucky ones.’ Everyone says that. The ones who passed away are the lucky ones. We’re the ones left with the troubles, you know. Everyone says that. So, psychologically, our mindset is shifting towards death; we’re starting to see death as a beauty, as salvation. Yet, we’re alive, as I said. We’ve found an opportunity to increase our righteous deeds, but, you see, due to the rush of life, due to financial difficulties, people can’t think about it, and everything becomes even more challenging.” (Maraş, Teacher, Female, 24)

“I have a strong sense of smell. Maybe it sounds simple, but I want to forget the smell of that concrete. Whenever I smell the earth anywhere, my hands and feet start to tremble. I really want to forget that smell. Besides, I want to forget the feeling of helplessness. I want to forget the sounds I heard, the scenes I saw, the lingering sense of helplessness. Maybe we’ll move on, maybe we won’t. Right now, we’re continuing like this. Somehow, we’re living, but I want to break free from this feeling as soon as possible.” (Kahramanmaraş, Teacher, Female, 24)

“We walk through these streets. I wish I could forget the screams, the screams from within the wreckage. I wish I could forget the moment when those body bags were pulled out of there.” (Adıyaman, Worker, Male, 25)

“During that earthquake, we left our homes, and it was like a scene from a zombie movie amidst all those buildings. People banging on windows, calling for help from amidst the rubble. Even if you manage to forget that moment, it feels like you’ll get through it. But that scene doesn’t leave. You can’t forget their faces. In that moment, if you stop, you can’t help, and if you keep going, it weighs on you.” (Adıyaman, Teacher, Female, 25)

The interviews reveal a recurring theme of wanting to forget the scent of concrete and the feeling of helplessness, indicating that traumatic memories are still very much alive for survivors. Negative emotions are frequently cited, stemming from the absence of a secure environment for daily life routines and the persistent reminders of material and spiritual losses in the form of uncleared debris. The slow progress of debris removal efforts further dampens perceptions of the future.

Uncertainty emerges as a prevailing emotion, frequently mentioned in discussions about future prospects. This concept is used to describe a lack of information, from basic necessities of daily life to legal processes, exacerbating the traumatic dimensions of the earthquake. Uncertainty and an inability to anticipate the future are identified as significant challenges for normalization, potentially on par with physical obstacles.

“We’re all aware. We can’t bring back what we’ve lost. Neither we nor the government can do that. But from now on, there’s uncertainty about what people have lost (some lost their homes, some their cars, some their jobs, some their capital, some their workplaces). A man, a shop owner, has lost all his capital and his workplace, and there’s no regulation regarding this. There’s no effort regarding this. I mean, for that person, you can say, ‘Alright buddy, you’re a registered shop owner here. We’re thinking about

*a plan for you. Keep your hopes up. We'll create an environment that will partially encourage you to reopen this business or provide an atmosphere for it to operate.' You can do the same for someone who lost their home. But unfortunately, there are still uncertainties about the process. There's no clear plan or announcement. And this makes it even harder for people to return to normal."* (Adıyaman, Politician, Male, 51)

While many interviewees have experienced strong negative emotions, it appears that only a few have been able to access psychosocial support. Even those who have suffered losses have not received support. Some interviewees attribute the reluctance to seek psychosocial support to cultural norms and the preference for group sessions by the support teams.


*"We've never seen anything like psychological support, never seen anything. Besides, during this process, I've once again noticed this: if you live in Turkey, the more connections you have, the stronger you are. I mean, if I have to say that the government is with us here, I haven't seen it."* (Maraş, Businessman, Male, 45)

*"Talking is very comforting. Before getting support, we used to keep everything to ourselves, mostly internalize it. Nobody in the family wanted to remind anyone of anything; we were keeping it inside. But when we started getting support, I realized that talking makes me feel better. Expressing it provides a different perspective, a glimmer of hope, a source of hope. Hearing a sentence from someone that I can hope for feels much better, more positive for me. I can pull myself together, you know."* (Maraş, Teacher, Female, 24)

## EDUCATIONAL DISRUPTION AND SUPPORT

As anticipated, the earthquake had a substantial impact on the continuity of education. Among the students surveyed, 22.2% were unable to pursue their education without any interruption. However, 2.6% managed to continue face-to-face education without interruption, while 6.6% were able to continue their education online without any hindrance. Additionally, 30.9% resumed face-to-face education after a certain period, and 36.2% transitioned to online education after a delay.

Figure 7. Were you able to continue your education after the earthquake? (For students, %)




Gender did not appear to influence the rates of continuous education or disruptions in other formats. However, a notable relationship was discerned between the ability to sustain education and several factors, including household income, the condition of their residences post-earthquake, cultural identity (ethnicity and sect), and their location of residence following the earthquake.

While the overall rate of students who could maintain uninterrupted face-to-face education stood at 2.9%, this figure rose to 12.5% for students from households earning less than 5,000 TL monthly. This observation may be attributed to a higher incidence of earthquake-induced damage to schools in neighborhoods inhabited by households with lower incomes, as well as a higher rate of relocation among these households.

Conversely, the rate of students who were unable to continue their education was 22.2% on average, but this figure escalated to 41.7% for those whose homes were destroyed in the earthquake, 37.9% among Kurds, and 44.4% for those residing in tents. These statistics underscore the severe disruptions to education in these specific groups.

Moreover, a significant number of students, 11.5%, were unable to participate in any on-line classes, with 30.8% and 40.4% reporting limited or partial access, respectively.

Figure 8. Were you able to attend online classes? (For students, %)




Household income seemed to exert an influence on participation in online education, as no students from households earning less than 5,000 TL per month could engage in either all or most online classes. Furthermore, the rate of students who had never participated in online education was 11.5%, with nearly a third of students from households with monthly incomes below 5,000 TL reporting no access to online education.

Table 3. Were you able to attend online classes? (Income after the earthquake, %)

	General	0-5.000	5.001-10.000	10.001-20.000	Incomes exceeding 20,000 TL
I attended all of it	3,8	0,0	5,3	2,1	6,3
I attended most of them.	13,5	0,0	21,1	8,5	12,5
I attended half of them	40,4	33,3	31,6	44,7	50,0
I was able to attend only a small part of it	30,8	33,3	26,3	40,4	12,5
I never attended	11,5	33,3	15,8	4,3	18,8

The findings suggest that students perceived disruptions in their education after the earthquake, with only 9.5% of students believing that “the efficiency of education has not changed.” In contrast, the overwhelming majority, 84.7%, expressed that the efficiency of education had diminished to varying degrees.

Figure 9. How did the productivity of your education change after the earthquake? (%)



## EDUCATIONAL CHALLENGES AND CONCERNS

Data reveals that income level and place of residence wield significant influence over perceptions of educational efficiency. Although 54.7% of all students reported a substantial decrease in educational efficiency, a more pronounced decline was observed among specific subgroups. Notably, 75% of students residing in households with a monthly income below 5,000 TL, 66.7% of those living in tents, and 60.7% of those in container housing expressed substantial decreases in educational efficiency.

Qualitative interviews supplement these findings by highlighting critical issues within the realm of education. Interviewees frequently emphasized the considerable setbacks in the educational sector. There are apprehensions regarding the upcoming academic year, particularly in container cities, and questions about how children starting primary school will be accommodated. Concerns encompass the provision of supplementary training, the importance of schools not only for education but also for the overall well-being of children, and the necessity for regulatory measures in addressing these challenges. Interviewees contend that the educational inequalities that emerged during the pandemic have been exacerbated by the earthquake, with potentially enduring negative consequences.

“Educational inequalities that emerged during the pandemic have now been exacerbated by the earthquake. In Hatay, since the first day of the earthquake, it can be said that the children’s education has come to a complete halt. Even now, all schools are in ruins. We don’t know how we will start education and training in September. There is a great deal of uncertainty. It is said that schools will be opened in container cities or the ones that remain intact will be opened. However, there are no people left around the schools that remain intact. How will children get there? Imagine a school that has remained intact but there are no buildings around it. The closest family will have to send their child there, in the midst of ruins, from a kilometer or two away. They will have to go from a place with security issues, and these children will, at best, study in the dust and dirt, and again, at best, maybe in classrooms with fifty people. I can say the same for classes to be opened in container cities.” (Hatay, NGO Worker, Male, 45)

“We need to think about it in conjunction with the pandemic. In this region, children have faced significant disadvantages in the last three years. Shall we call it a lost generation? They will experience this. There will be a price to pay for Turkey in the future, but it is difficult to estimate how measurable it will be. Along with the earthquake, making all universities switch to online education across the country was also a mistake. Closing them was wrong; it completely detached young people from schools. This will definitely leave a mark because, firstly, it leads to significant inequality of opportunity. Those who have means, those who have internet at home, suddenly gain an advantage. Or those with good economic conditions become even more advantaged with private lessons. Considering all of these, it seems that these last few years will have a significant cost on generations in Turkey.” (Malatya, Academic, Male, 54)

There seem to be difficulties in accessing online education due to physical and technological barriers. The inability to establish a connection with school, technological inadequacies have increased educational losses, exacerbated by the impact of the pandemic.

“Online education was wrong; they threw children into more traumatic family environments by taking them out of school. Especially in the earthquake region, children could have been in different situations and emotions, at least by going to school, with their peers, peers, and teachers. But what did they do? They find it easy to do everything at home because education is always the easiest to eliminate. I neither support it nor find it right. I mean, children could have better psychologically overcome this process with their peers. Teachers could have done the same. It could have been good for everyone, but it is wasted, the first education is always lost.” (Adana, Housewife, Female, 30)

“He started school. Covid started. They were getting education through tablets. Education was wasted in the first grade. Then in the second grade, the child started to recover. He moved on to the third, that’s when he truly grasped it. Fifteen days later, there was an earthquake. Now we’ve gone back to square one with our child. Our child’s psychology has been shattered.” (Adiyaman, Tradesman, Male, 38)

There are concerns about the success of students preparing for high school and university entrance exams.

“How can this be compensated? How can this lost time be filled? My child needs to attend a prep course, receive special education. But look at my neighbors, they have children but no such means. It became like lost time for the children. Perhaps remedial classes can be an option, or additional tutoring, or summer school. Otherwise, how will it be possible? My neighbor has a child. Preparing for university next year. I feel sorry for him. Everything is lacking for him.” (Malatya, Farmer, Female, 58)

There is a prevailing belief that the deficiencies in education cannot be remedied. Options like additional tutoring and special education are frequently mentioned, but economic means pose a significant obstacle. In addition to concerns about addressing the deficiencies, it is noted that school dropouts and child labor have also been triggered by economic difficulties.

Interviewees from Hatay, in particular, voiced concerns about the uncertain state of education in the aftermath of the earthquake. All schools in the area were reportedly de-

stroyed, leaving questions about how education will proceed in September. The absence of a nearby student population around intact schools further complicates this matter. These concerns underscore the hardships faced by children and educators alike, from studying amidst rubble to navigating safety concerns. The interviewees express these uncertainties surrounding the educational landscape in Hatay.

Moreover, a recurring theme in the interviews is the perceived problem of accessing on-line education due to physical and technological barriers. Online education is criticized for removing children from the social environment of schools and placing them in potentially traumatic domestic settings. The lack of technological infrastructure and connectivity is cited as contributing to educational losses during the pandemic and earthquake.

The interviews also illuminate concerns regarding the academic success of students preparing for high school and university entrance exams. Parents are anxious about their children's education, particularly those who require special education services and lack access to private institutions. The disruption caused by the earthquake has created a sense of lost time and the need for compensatory measures, such as additional classes or summer school, to bridge the educational gap.

In summary, both quantitative data and qualitative interviews underscore the challenges and uncertainties in the education sector following the earthquake, with potential long-term consequences for students' educational outcomes and well-being.


The prevailing sentiment often centers around the perception that the deficit in education is inherently irreparable. While potential solutions like supplementary lessons and private education are frequently discussed, the constraints imposed by economic circumstances represent a significant impediment to their implementation. Furthermore, alongside the apprehensions related to addressing educational shortcomings, there is a notable observation that economic hardships contribute to a rise in school dropouts and child labor.

## HEALTH

The study's findings reveal that there was no catastrophic disruption in healthcare access attributable to the earthquake, with nearly half of the interviewees successfully accessing health services. Approximately 21.4% of respondents reported having encountered no difficulties in obtaining healthcare, while 23.3% indicated experiencing minimal obstacles. Conversely, 35.9% faced significant challenges, and 8.7% reported receiving no services at all.


While the study indicates that there was no catastrophic breakdown in healthcare access, it highlights the influence of political and cultural identity on both the experience of accessing health services and individuals' perceptions of this access. For instance, while 21.4% of respondents reported no issues with healthcare access, this figure significantly dropped to 5.7% for Arabs, 6.6% for Alevis, 11.4% for HDP voters, and 14.5% for CHP voters. These findings demonstrate that political affiliation (HDP, CHP) as well as ethnic and religious identity (Arab, Alevi) can impact healthcare access and the associated perceptions.

Figure 10. Are you currently experiencing any difficulties in accessing healthcare services? (%)



Responses to inquiries regarding the provision of specialized healthcare services for the elderly and disabled suggest a somewhat distinct situation. Approximately 40% of interviewees believed that none or only a few of the elderly individuals' needs were met, while 30% perceived that most or all of these needs were adequately addressed. These findings indicate that political and cultural identities not only influence opinions regarding healthcare access but also affect views on the fulfillment of healthcare needs for the elderly.

Figure 11. Are the specific healthcare needs of elderly and disabled individuals being met? (%)



The data indicates that varying proportions of interviewees held divergent perceptions regarding the adequacy of healthcare provision for the elderly population.

Table 4. Are the specific healthcare needs of elderly and disabled individuals being met? (Ethnicity, %)

	General	Turkish	Kurdish	Arab	Other
No, their needs are not met at all	14,1	9,5	11,6	47,5	27,3
Many of their needs are not met	25,7	25,6	28,7	19,0	27,3
There are very few needs that are not met	17,9	20,6	14,4	8,9	18,2
All their needs are met	14,1	14,3	17,7	5,1	9,1
I don't know/I have no idea	28,2	29,9	27,6	19,6	18,2

Approximately 14.1% of respondents believed that none of the elderly individuals' needs were met. Interestingly, this percentage differed based on political affiliation, with 8.4% of AKP voters, 31.8% of HDP voters, and 23.4% of CHP voters expressing this viewpoint. Moreover, there were distinctions related to ethnic backgrounds, as 9.5% of Turks held the belief that none of the elderly needs were met, while a significantly higher percentage, 47.5%, of Arabs shared this perspective. These statistics underscore the extent to which political preferences can shape individuals' perceptions of healthcare quality and access.

Qualitative interviews underscore that the removal of debris and demolition activities have emerged as significant health concerns in the post-earthquake period. It is notable that demolitions, conducted without adequate safety precautions, have contributed to cities being enveloped in clouds of dust. Consequently, the prevalence of viral infections, including diarrhea, has increased, and dust-related lung diseases have surged.

“Demolition contractors are largely carrying out on-site iron separation from debris. However, there is no irrigation during demolitions and debris removal. Despite the statements from the municipality and the ministry, none of the companies take this seriously, and there is no supervision regarding their disregard. The problem of dusty environments that can cause various serious diseases still persists in the heart of the city. There are accidents when removing items from damaged buildings, such as dismantling doors and windows. Although police cannot be assigned to every building, precautions can be taken to prevent entry into heavily damaged buildings. These are still missing. Furthermore, demolitions are progressing very slowly, and buildings on the brink of collapse pose a serious threat to life. Adequate precautions are still not taken around them. In many main arteries and streets, unfortunately, many buildings that are about to collapse, whose structure has been compromised, and which are leaning dangerously, have not yet been intervened. This is a very serious problem.” (Adiyaman, NGO Worker, Female, 32)

It is noted that the lack of hygiene has led to an increase in diseases, especially fungal infections, particularly affecting women.

“The problem with hygiene affects women the most. Diseases like fungus have increased. Especially with the heat, such diseases have increased. Intestinal infections, epidemics have increased a lot. Covid had already left damage in the lungs, now pneumonia and shortness of breath complaints have started due to the dust from the debris. It is difficult to make an appointment. So we go to the emergency room. There is a shortage of doctors in many branches. Most doctors have left the region.” (Malatya, NGO Representative, Female, 47)

Due to the damage suffered by hospitals in the earthquake, they cannot provide services, and in hospitals that do provide services, there is already a shortage of specialist doctors and equipment, leading to health problems. Adverse conditions of life and work have led to doctors and healthcare staff wanting to leave the region. The inadequacy of hospital capacities and the shortage of doctors make it difficult to make appointments and continue treatment processes. Patients requiring regular check-ups and routine medication use face difficulties in continuing their treatment. Economic crises have also led to problems with drug supply in pharmacies.

“Today, I had something to do with a doctor again. Right now, doctors are trying to leave this city. They are trying to go to other cities because the physical conditions and circumstances are not suitable for their work. A friend of mine was in the hospital, and they told the patient’s relative, ‘We’re going into surgery, you need to procure this medication and come.’ The patient goes outside and starts looking for medication, but pharmacies no longer want to sell medications easily. They are constantly running out of stock due to price fluctuations every day. Many essential medicines are constantly unavailable.” (Maraş, Businessman, Male, 45)

“There is a health center in the container. We go there for any medicine or small issues, but apart from that, hospitals are closed. Currently, two hospitals are operating in Maraş. And there is extreme congestion. For example, I cannot get an appointment for my own illnesses yet. We go in the morning, but we don’t get a turn; we can’t even get a number just to get an appointment. So, we have to return without even getting a number. We still couldn’t get treatment for our existing health problems. There is a great problem with hospitals right now. There are no turns, no appointments, nothing at all.” (Maraş, Businessman, Male, 45)

“There is a field hospital. I went there and they told me that my blood has an infection. I need to show this to a dermatologist constantly and get treatments, and my medication has run out. I went to Kocaeli Hospital. There was no dermatologist there. What kind of hospital is that? Let me tell you one thing now. If I faint here, it will take them two hours to intervene.” (Hatay, Housewife, Female, 52)

Furthermore, interviews suggest that inadequate hygiene conditions, particularly among women, have led to an increase in diseases such as fungal infections. The combination of the earthquake aftermath, the introduction of unhygienic living conditions, and the emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated health-related issues. These findings underscore the need for comprehensive public health initiatives and hygiene education to mitigate these issues effectively.

A recurring theme in the interviews pertains to the challenges faced by the healthcare system due to earthquake-induced damage to hospitals, a lack of specialized physicians, and inadequate medical equipment. Healthcare professionals’ unfavorable living and working conditions have led to a desire to relocate, further compounding the scarcity of healthcare providers. This, in turn, has created difficulties in securing medical appointments and accessing treatment. Patients requiring regular check-ups and ongoing medication face significant hurdles in continuing their treatment regimens. Additionally, the economic crisis has disrupted the pharmaceutical supply chain, impacting medicine availability.

Moreover, the scarcity of hospitals operational after the earthquake has contributed to overcrowding, making it exceedingly difficult for patients to secure medical appointments or receive timely care. The interviews underscore the need for urgent action to address these critical healthcare system challenges, including the retention of healthcare professionals in the region, the enhancement of hospital capacity, and measures to stabilize the pharmaceutical supply chain.

### III. THOSE WHO LEFT, THOSE WHO STAYED, THOSE WHO RETURNED

Interviews reveal that 29.3% of respondents relocated to another city following the earthquake, while the majority (70.7%) opted to remain in the earthquake-affected city. An intriguing trend emerged concerning household income, indicating that both lower and upper-income groups were more likely to relocate compared to those in the middle-income bracket. This suggests a complex relationship between household income levels and post-earthquake relocation decisions, warranting further investigation.

**Table 5. Did you relocate to a different city after the earthquake?**  
**Have you stayed in another city? (Income after the earthquake, %)**


	General	0-5.000	5.001-10.000	10.001-20.000	Incomes exceeding 20,000 TL
Yes	29,3	45,5	27,6	26,5	40,2
No	70,7	54,5	72,4	73,5	59,8

The data reveals that 29.3% of respondents chose to relocate to a different city following the earthquake. Notably, the rate of relocation was higher among individuals with a monthly household income of less than 5,000 TL, standing at 45.5%. Surprisingly, the rate was also elevated for those with a monthly household income of 20,000 TL or more, reaching 40.2%. In contrast, respondents within the income range of 5,000-10,000 TL and 10,000-20,000 TL displayed lower rates of relocation, at 27.6% and 26.5%, respectively.

This distribution suggests that individuals with lower incomes may have relocated out of necessity, while those in the higher income group may have done so based on choice or convenience.

The majority of those who changed cities (55.9%) chose to stay with family, relatives, or friends, while 5% opted for empty relative-owned homes, and 1.1% stayed in their village houses. This data highlights that a significant proportion of individuals who relocated did so within their close social circles, such as family and friends. Furthermore, 18.9% of respondents stayed in accommodations provided by central or local government authorities. Of these, 4.8% were lodged in hotels at no cost, and 13.2% temporarily rented houses. This distribution underscores the enduring strength of traditional social relations in Turkey, while also revealing the limited capacity of public institutions during times of crises like earthquakes.


Figure 12. Where did you stay at the place you went to? (%)



The proportion of respondents staying in accommodations provided by immediate surroundings did not significantly differ among cultural identity groups and income levels, as it remained high across all categories. However, a slight variation was observed concerning temporary house rentals, with a significantly lower rate among Kurds compared to other groups.


The most prominent problems experienced by those who relocated were economic in nature, accounting for 33% of reported issues. This was followed by psychological problems related to housing (13%), challenges associated with living in a foreign place (7% adaptation and 5% foreignness), earthquake anxiety (2%), and other psychological problems (6%).

Figure 13. What were the most significant issues that you or your relatives encountered in the place where you relocated? (%)




Regarding problems faced in their original cities, housing was identified as the foremost concern at 15%, closely followed by economic issues, unemployment, and the cost of living (16%). Problems related to municipal services, which may have been exacerbated by the earthquake, also played a significant role, with 13% citing concerns related to drinking water, 4% related to transportation, 3% to infrastructure, and 4% to debris removal.

Figure 14. In your opinion, what are the most pressing issues or needs in this city at the moment? (%)




Additionally, data indicates that a significant portion (64.5%) of individuals who initially left for other cities ultimately returned to their pre-earthquake residences.

Figure 15. Why did you return to this place? (%)



Among those who returned, nearly half (49.9%) went back to their own homes, while 7.5% rented alternative housing, 21.1% stayed in containers, and 7.4% resided in tents.

Figure 16. Have any members of your immediate family or close relatives undergone immigration? (%)




The survey data reveals distinct migration patterns among respondents. Specifically, 8% of participants reported personal migration from their nuclear family, while a larger proportion, constituting 30%, indicated migration among their close

relatives. Additionally, 21% of respondents disclosed migration experiences involving their distant relatives, and 13% cited the migration of their friends.

Within the nexus of close relatives, family members, and friends, a notable convergence is observed between those who migrated to other cities and those who did not. This convergence is particularly evident in the substantial majority of respondents (51%) who reported migration experiences within their immediate and extended familial networks.

Further analysis of the data indicates that a significant proportion of those who decided to migrate (61.2%) chose to relocate to metropolitan areas, notably cities such as Istanbul and Izmir. Conversely, a considerable portion (37.5%) opted for migration to proximate provinces.

Figure 17. Do you hold the belief that individuals who have left will eventually return? (%)



In the survey conducted, it was observed that a minority, comprising 10% of the participants, maintained the belief that all individuals who have departed will eventually rejoin. Conversely, a slightly larger faction, constituting 20.5%, expressed the viewpoint that a majority of the departed individuals will return. Additionally, a substantial portion of 19% of respondents contended that some of those who have left will eventually make their way back, while a significant 20.9% asserted that none of the departed individuals would return.


Notably, a noteworthy 30% of respondents were of the opinion that most of the departed individuals would return, further underscoring the prevailing optimism. Nevertheless, it is imperative to acknowledge that a considerable 21% of participants maintained the pessimistic outlook that those who have left will never return.

In terms of temporal expectations, it is worth noting that approximately half of the participants believed that nearly half of the departed individuals would return within a span of 1 to 5 years.

## IV. WHO IS RESPONSIBLE?

The majority of respondents placed responsibility on relevant institutions for the extent of destruction experienced during the earthquake. Notably, 67.2% of respondents believed that if adequate precautions had been taken, the destruction could have been significantly reduced. Conversely, only 15% of respondents felt that demolition could not have been prevented.

Figure 18. Do you think the earthquake could have been less destructive? (%)




This perspective appeared to be influenced by a variety of factors, encompassing education level, income, the extent of damage sustained by respondents' residences, ethnic background, and their political party affiliations. To elaborate, individuals with a higher level of education, students, those with a monthly household income exceeding 20,000 TL, individuals whose homes experienced significant damage, individuals of Arab descent, and voters aligned with the CHP, HDP, and İYİ Party were notably more inclined to hold the view that the extent of destruction could have been significantly mitigated. To illustrate, 77.3% of respondents with an educational background surpassing high school education, along with 81.5% of students, espoused this perspective. Similarly, 77.8% of respondents reporting a monthly household income exceeding 20,000 TL concurred with this sentiment. Furthermore, among individuals whose residences suffered severe damage, 73.5% held a similar viewpoint. Among Arab respondents, this perspective was shared by 79.7%, and it was also prevalent among the supporters of political parties such as the CHP (77.5%), HDP (81.8%), and İYİ Party (81.6%)

In contrast, AK Party voters were less likely to share this perspective, with only 56.7% believing that adequate precautions could have minimized the destruction. Furthermore, while the average rate of respondents who believed that destruction was unavoidable was 15.1%, this percentage was notably higher at 25.3% among AK Party voters.

Regarding the allocation of responsibility for the earthquake's destructiveness, respondents identified the construction sector and contractors as the primary culprits, assigning them 40.4% of the responsibility. Municipalities were seen as the second most responsible party, with 30.6% of the blame, while the government was deemed responsible by 28.3% of respondents.


Figure 19. On a scale of 1 to 100, what percentage of responsibility would you assign to each of them? (%)



## CONSTRUCTION SECTOR AND CONTRACTORS

The majority of respondents expressed the view that the construction sector and contractors bore significant responsibility for the devastating earthquake. Among the respondents, 3.7% believed that the construction industry and contractors held no responsibility, 5.3% believed they held little responsibility, 23.7% felt they were moderately responsible, while a substantial 67.3% believed that the construction industry and contractors bore high responsibility.

Figure 20. What was the role of the construction sector/contractors in making the earthquake so devastating? (%)




The proportion of respondents who held the opinion that the construction industry and contractors had no role in the earthquake's destructiveness was higher among individuals with a monthly household income of less than 5,000 TL, those whose homes were destroyed in the earthquake, and AK Party voters. Specifically, 12.7% of respondents with a monthly household income below 5,000 TL, 7.4% of those whose houses were destroyed in the earthquake, and 6.1% of AK Party voters believed that the construction industry and contractors had no role in the destructiveness of the earthquake. It is possible that the more severe consequences experienced by the first two groups, as well as the desire among AK Party voters to reduce the government's responsibility, contributed to this differentiation.

## MUNICIPALITIES

Only a small fraction of respondents (7.4%) believed that the municipality played no role in the earthquake's destructiveness, while 52.1% felt that the municipality bore significant responsibility.

Opinions regarding the municipality's role in the earthquake's destructiveness varied depending on factors such as education level, income level, cultural identity, and political party preferences. Among all respondents, 52.1% believed that the municipality had a high

Figure 21. What role do you think municipalities played in making the earthquake so devastating? (%)




role in the devastating earthquake, with 75.1% of Alevis, 67.7% of Arabs, 70% of CHP supporters, 72.7% of HDP supporters, 72.3% of individuals with education beyond high school, and 63.5% of those with a household income of 20,000 TL or more sharing this view. In contrast, only 37.3% of AK Party supporters perceived the municipality's role in the devastating earthquake to be significant. This difference might be attributed to the fact that the mayors of all earthquake-affected cities, except Hatay, were supporters of the AK Party.

## GOVERNMENT

While 13.1% of respondents believed that the government had no role in the earthquake's destructiveness, 46.3% held the opinion that the government played a significant role in the destruction.

Figure 22. What role do you think the government played in making the earthquake so devastating? (%)



Similar to perceptions of municipal responsibility, opinions regarding the government's role in the earthquake's destructiveness varied depending on factors such as education level, income level, cultural identity, and political party preferences. Among all respondents, 46.3% believed that the government had a high role in the devastating earthquake, with 71.6% of Alevis, 65.2% of Arabs, 68.6% of CHP supporters, and 75% of HDP supporters sharing this view. Additionally, 67.8% of individuals with education beyond high school and 66.7% of those with a household income of 20,000 TL or more perceived the government's role as significant. Conversely, 37.3% of AK Party voters believed that the government's role in the devastating earthquake was significant.


## V. DISASTER MANAGEMENT AND INSTITUTIONS

Disaster management efforts by the government, opposition parties, and the Red Crescent were generally regarded as unsuccessful. Only 33.6% of respondents considered the government's disaster management successful or very successful, while 16.2% held the same view regarding opposition parties, and 32% for the Red Crescent. Notably, fewer respondents considered the performance of opposition parties successful compared to the government and the Red Crescent.

### GOVERNMENT

Respondents' assessments of the government's disaster management performance were as follows: 16.4% considered it very unsuccessful, 29.4% unsuccessful, 23% neither successful nor unsuccessful, 21.5% successful, and 8.1% very successful.

Figure 23. How would you evaluate the government's or state's disaster management performance during the earthquake? (%)




It was evident that variables such as education, income level, damage status, cultural identity, sect, and political preferences influenced opinions about the government's performance. A higher percentage of respondents with education beyond high school (28.5%), those with a monthly household income exceeding 20,000 TL (23.8%), individuals whose houses were heavily damaged (73.5%), Arabs (26.6%), Alevis (34.9%), CHP voters (26.3%), and HDP voters (54.5%) believed that the government's disaster management performance was very unsuccessful. Overall, 16.4% of the interviewees regarded the government's performance as very unsuccessful.

## RED CRESCENT

Opinions regarding the Red Crescent were more diverse, with respondents expressing both very unsuccessful and successful assessments. Specifically, 19.5% of respondents found the Red Crescent very unsuccessful, 27.4% unsuccessful, 18.2% neither successful nor unsuccessful, 25.1% successful, and 6.9% very successful.

Figure 24. What is your assessment of the performance of the Red Crescent (KIZILAY) during the earthquake process? (%)




Cultural identity, income level, and political preferences appear to exert a significant influence on perceptions of the Red Crescent's performance. Among respondents, 19.5% found the Red Crescent's performance to be very unsuccessful. In contrast, a lower proportion of Turks (13.9%) and AK Party supporters (6.6%) expressed the view that the Red Crescent's performance was very unsuccessful. Conversely, the perception of the Red Crescent's performance as very unsuccessful was notably higher among Arabs (52.5%) and Alevis (51.1%). Similarly, 56.8% of HDP voters, 37.7% of CHP voters, and 25.9% of respondents with a monthly household income exceeding 5,000 TL believed that the Red Crescent's performance was very unsuccessful. These variations suggest that cultural identity, political affiliation, and income levels contribute to differing assessments of the Red Crescent's performance.

## OPPOSITION PARTIES

The assessment of disaster management performance for opposition parties is as follows: 16.6% of respondents found it to be very unsuccessful, while 31.3% considered it unsuccessful. Additionally, 29.6% found it neither successful nor unsuccessful, 14.1% considered it successful, and 2.1% deemed it very successful.

Figure 25. What is your evaluation of the performance of opposition parties during the earthquake in terms of disaster management? (%)



In contrast to the influence of cultural identity, income levels, and political preferences observed in opinions about the government and Red Crescent's disaster management performance, a similar trend is not evident in the assessment of opposition parties' performance. The proportion of those who perceive opposition parties as successful and unsuccessful remains relatively balanced among different groups.

## VI. LEVEL OF TRUST

Responses to inquiries about changes in trust towards various institutions and groups following the earthquake reveal three significant findings:

Trust in groups or entities not directly associated with earthquake and disaster management has remained relatively stable.

Trust in institutions directly linked to earthquake and disaster management, including the President, Government, Governorship, Turkish Armed Forces, Law enforcement forces, and Municipality, has notably decreased.

The decline in trust in institutions directly related to Earthquake and Disaster Management is not uniform, varying significantly depending on factors such as education, income, cultural identity, and political inclination.

### ARTISTS, JOURNALISTS, NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES...

In the case of artists, journalists, neighboring countries, European countries, and Arab countries, there appears to be no significant change in trust levels. Approximately 50% of respondents reported that their trust in each of these five groups had not changed. Specifically, 50.3% indicated that their trust in artists remained unchanged, 50.3% reported no change in trust for journalists, 47.3% noted no change in trust for EU countries, 49.5% expressed unchanged trust in neighboring countries, and 49.7% reported no change in trust in Arab countries. Similarly, the proportions of individuals with low and very low confidence in these five groups are comparable.

Two groups witnessed a substantial increase in trust from circles not directly related to earthquake and disaster management: scientists and NGOs. Approximately 34% of respondents reported increased trust in seismologists, with 8.8% indicating a significant increase in trust. Likewise, around 32.2% of respondents reported increased trust in NGOs, with 8.3% indicating a significant increase.

### POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS

Trust in political institutions closely associated with earthquake and disaster management, such as the President, Government, and Municipality, has significantly declined. Approximately 40% of respondents reported no change in trust for these institutions, excluding municipalities. Specifically, the proportions of individuals whose trust in the President, Government, Municipality, and opposition parties remained unchanged are 40.5%, 38.3%, 30.3%, and 39.3%, respectively.

Table 6. Trust (%)

	President	Government	Municipalities	Opposition parties
Much Decreased	13,3	12,5	21,9	13,7
Decreased	25,0	27,7	30,2	27,9
Unchanged	40,5	38,3	30,3	39,3
Increased	13,1	11,9	9,7	10,7
Increased a lot	4,9	5,5	2,9	2,5
I don't know	3,2	4,1	5,1	5,8

## PRESIDENT

A substantial portion of respondents has experienced a loss of trust in the President. Specifically, 25% reported a decrease in trust in the President after the earthquake, while 13.3% reported a significant decrease in trust.

In contrast, 13.1% of respondents reported increased trust in the President, with 4.9% indicating a significant increase in trust.

An interesting observation emerges when examining the proportion of individuals who reported a significant decrease in trust in the President across various groups. Generally, those with higher education levels, both high and low income levels, Alevis, CHP and HDP voters, are more likely to exhibit low confidence in the President. Notably, 22.3% of those with an education level above high school, 18% of individuals with a monthly household income of 20,000 TL or more, and 18.2% of those with a monthly household income of less than 5,000 TL have experienced a significant decrease in trust in the President. Furthermore, 24% of Alevis, 24.9% of CHP voters, and 36.9% of HDP voters have expressed a significant decrease in trust in the President.

## GOVERNMENT

Approximately half of the interviewees have experienced a decrease in trust in the government. Specifically, 12.5% reported a decrease in trust in the government after the earthquake, while 27% indicated a significant decrease. Conversely, 11.9% of respondents reported increased trust in the government, with 5.5% noting a significant increase.

When examining the relationship between various variables and trust in the government, a pattern similar to the above emerges. Those with higher education levels, individuals with both high and low income levels, Alevis, and CHP and HDP voters are more likely to have low trust in the government. While the overall rate of those reporting a decrease in trust in the government is 12.5%, this rate increases to 21.1% among those with a high school education. Similarly, it stands at 19.6% for respondents with a monthly household income of 20,000 TL or more, 16.4% for those with a monthly household income below 5,000 TL, 21.4% for Alevis, 22.7% for CHP voters, and 27.3% for HDP voters.

## MUNICIPALITIES

Municipalities have witnessed one of the most significant declines in trust following the earthquake, with nearly half of citizens experiencing a decrease in trust. Specifically, 21.9% reported a significant decrease in trust in their municipality, while 30.2% noted a slight decrease. Conversely, 9.7% reported increased trust in their municipality, with 2.9% indicating a significant increase.

The distribution of respondents reporting a significant decrease in trust in municipalities is not uniform. While the overall rate of those reporting a decrease in trust in municipalities is 21.9%, this rate increases to 31.8% among those with a high school education. Additionally, it stands at 27.5% for respondents with a monthly household income of 20,000 TL or more, 27.9% for Alevis, 29.5% for CHP voters, and 38.6% for HDP voters.

## OPPOSITION PARTIES

Approximately half of the interviewees have experienced a decrease in trust in opposition parties. Specifically, 13.7% reported very low confidence in opposition parties, while 27.9% indicated a decrease in trust. Conversely, 10.7% reported increased trust in opposition parties, with only 2.5% noting a significant increase. A total of 39.3% of respondents reported no change in trust in opposition parties.

Among respondents with high levels of education and income, as well as those who vote for CHP and HDP, individuals with very low trust in the President, Government, Governorship, and Municipality are more prevalent. However, among these groups, those with very low trust in opposition parties are close to the overall average. Specifically, while 13.7% of respondents reported a significant decrease in trust in opposition parties, this rate is similar among the following groups: 16.5% among those with a high school education, 14.8% among those with a monthly household income of 20,000 TL or more, 13.5% among Alevis, and 12.5% among CHP voters and 25% among HDP voters.


## ADMINISTRATIVE INSTITUTIONS

There is an asymmetric change in trust levels concerning various institutions. The proportion of respondents reporting no change in trust in the Governorship, Justice, Directorate of Religious Affairs, Turkish Armed Forces, Law enforcement forces, and Media is quite similar. Specifically, 44.8%, 44.3%, 47.7%, 42.3%, 45.3%, and 49.5% reported no change in trust in these six institutions, respectively. Conversely, trust in security institutions such as the Turkish Armed Forces and the Law enforcement forces has decreased less compared to trust in the Governorship, Justice, and Religious Affairs institutions. This difference may be attributed to the fact that the former two institutions are related to security, whereas the latter three are more closely intertwined with political power.

## JUDICIAL SYSTEM - COURTS

Approximately 22.8% of interviewees have reported a decrease in trust in the judicial system, with 7.7% having very low confidence. Conversely, 11% reported increased trust in the justice system, while 5.3% noted a significant increase.

Figure 26. Judicial System - Courts (%)




The decline or increase in trust in the judicial system is not uniform across all groups. While 22.8% of all interviewees indicated a decrease in trust, this figure is 9.6% among Turks, 32.3% among Arabs, and 33.6% among Alevis. Additionally, it stands at 28.6% for those with a monthly household income of 20,000 TL or more, 33.8% for CHP supporters, and 36.4% for HDP supporters. These findings underscore the influence of education and income levels, cultural identity, and political inclination on the degree of trust in the justice system.

## GOVERNORSHIPS

The decrease in trust in the governorship mirrors that in the justice system. Specifically, 21.9% reported a decrease in trust in the governorship, with 7.9% having very low confidence. Conversely, 11.9% reported increased trust in the governorship, while 4.1% noted a significant increase.


Figure 27. Governorships (%)



The decline or increase in trust in the governorship also exhibits non-uniform patterns among different groups. While 21.9% of all interviewees reported a decrease in trust, this figure is 17.4% among Turks, 52.5% among Arabs, and 46.3% among Alevis. Additionally, it stands at 29.1% for those with a monthly household income of 20,000 TL or more, 35.5% among CHP supporters, and 22.7% among HDP supporters. Furthermore, the overall rate of those reporting a decrease in trust in the governorship is 7.9%, but this rate rises to 25% for HDP supporters. These findings highlight the influence of education and income levels, cultural identity, and political inclination on the degree of trust in the governorship.

## DIRECTORATE OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS (“DIYANET”)

Figure 28. Directorate of Religious Affairs (%)




Approximately 9.8% of interviewees have reported a significant decrease in trust in the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet), with 17.6% experiencing a decrease in trust. Conversely, 10.7% reported increased trust in the Diyanet, while 3% noted a significant increase.

The decline in trust in the Directorate of Religious Affairs is not uniform. Specifically, 17.6% of all interviewees reported a decrease in trust in the Diyanet. However, this figure rises to 22.8% among those with a monthly household income of over 20,000 TL, 26.6% among Arabs, and 28.4% among Alevis. Additionally, 24.6% of CHP supporters and 34.1% of HDP supporters reported a decrease in trust in the religious authority. These findings suggest that income levels, cultural identity, and political inclination influence the degree of trust in religious institutions.

## TURKISH ARMED FORCES

In contrast to the institutions of Courts, Governorships, and the Directorate of Religious Affairs, a smaller proportion of individuals experience a decline in trust in the Turkish Armed Forces, while a greater proportion exhibit an increase in trust. Specifically, 3.7% of respondents express very low confidence in the TSK, 12.3% report a decrease in confidence, 24.1% indicate an increase in confidence, and 10.3% note a significant increase in confidence.


Figure 29. Turkish Armed Forces (%)



## LAW ENFORCEMENT FORCES

The trend of change in trust in the law enforcement forces closely resembles that of trust in the Turkish Armed Forces. Specifically, 3.9% express very low confidence in the law enforcement forces, 12.3% experience a decline in trust, 23.2% report an increase in trust, and 7.6% declare a significant increase in trust.

Figure 30. Law Enforcement Forces (%)



The distribution of decreased trust in the law enforcement forces more closely resembles that of the Governorship and the Directorate of Religious Affairs rather than the Turkish Armed Forces. Among all respondents, 12.3% attest to a decrease in trust in the law enforcement forces. However, this rate varies among subgroups, with 8.9% for Turks, 16.9% for those with a monthly household income exceeding 20,000 TL, 27.2% for Arabs, and 25.3% for Alevites. Additionally, 19.1% of CHP supporters and 29.5% of HDP supporters indicate a decline in trust. It is evident that income level, cultural identity, and political inclination play a role in determining the likelihood of decreased trust in the law enforcement forces.


The data concerning declining trust in institutions reveal a significant finding. CHP supporters and individuals with high income levels display patterns of trust erosion more in line with those of Alevites, Arabs, and Kurds in relation to institutions associated with

the government, rather than institutions associated with the state, such as the Turkish Armed Forces. Conversely, they exhibit levels of trust erosion that more closely resemble those of AK Party and İYİ Party supporters concerning institutions linked to the state, while deviating from the average concerning trust in government-associated institutions, such as the Governorship, Law enforcement forces, Justice, and Religious Affairs.

## MEDIA

The media sector experiences no dramatic shifts in trust, with nearly half of respondents indicating that their trust in the media remains unchanged. However, 6.1% report a significant decline in trust, while 15.6% mention a decrease in trust, and 11.9% express increased trust, with 4.1% noting a significant increase.

Figure 31. Media (%)




Two notable points arise with regard to trust in the media. Firstly, the rate of those stating that their trust in the media has remained unaltered is higher than those expressing no change in trust for state institutions. Secondly, the distribution of declining trust in the media does not exhibit the same skewness observed in declining trust in state institutions. Among all respondents, 15.6% perceive a decrease in trust in the media. This rate stands at 14.4% for Turks, 14.3% for those with a monthly household income exceeding 20,000 TL, 19% for Arabs, 18.8% for Alevis, 15.9% for CHP supporters, and 25% for HDP supporters. Notably, HDP supporters, who align with CHP voters, Arabs, and those with high income levels concerning trust in institutions, deviate from these groups in terms of trust in opposition parties and the media, highlighting a more widespread and deeply rooted decline in trust among HDP voters.

## FUTURE EXPECTATIONS

Concurrently with the decline in trust in institutions, confidence in the future has also waned. Less than one-third of respondents (29.9%) believe that the state will become more effective in managing disasters in the future, while 41.3% hold the contrary view.

Figure 32. Do you believe that state authorities will respond more effectively in future disasters? (%)



It is evident that there exists a correlation between confidence in the future and various factors such as income level, cultural identity, and political party preferences. In parallel with the decline in trust in institutions, confidence in the prospects for the future has also diminished. While 41.3% of all respondents hold the belief that the state will not become more effective in managing disasters in the future, this percentage decreases slightly to 38.7% among Turks. In contrast, 53.4% of those with a monthly household income exceeding 20,000 TL and 64.6% of Arab respondents anticipate that the state will not exhibit increased effectiveness in disaster management in the future. Similarly, 65.9% of HDP voters and 62.8% of CHP voters share the perspective that the state's effectiveness in disaster management will not improve in the future.

Another pertinent aspect regarding confidence in the future pertains to views on the likelihood of holding those accountable for the earthquake-induced destruction responsible. A majority of interviewees express doubts about the likelihood of punishment for those responsible for the devastation. Specifically, 37.1% assert that no one will face consequences, while an additional 23.7% believe that very few of those responsible will be held accountable. In contrast, only 9.6% believe that all those responsible will face consequences.

## OVERALL CHANGES

The earthquake and the ensuing destruction do not appear to have instigated significant alterations in the voting behavior of citizens. A substantial 81% of respondents indicate that they have not altered their political preferences in the aftermath of the earthquake. Those who acknowledge a change in their party choice constitute a mere 19%. The absence of substantial shifts in political party preferences, despite the widespread destruction resulting from the earthquake, public discontent with post-earthquake disaster management efforts, and heightened apprehensions about the future, can potentially be attributed to several factors.

Primarily, it is crucial to recognize that Turkey is characterized by intense political polarization, wherein voter preferences tend to be resilient to change in such polarized contexts. Furthermore, cultural identity is widely acknowledged as a determinant of voter preferences in Turkey, suggesting that structural variables like cultural identity may exert more significant influence over political choices than cyclical factors such as the government's performance following earthquakes and disasters. Moreover, voters may have refrained from assigning sole responsibility for the earthquake-induced disaster to the government, possibly adopting a more nuanced perspective. Lastly, the limited appeal of the opposition may have also hindered substantial shifts in voter preferences.





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